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Abstract 
 
A public-private partnership (PPP) is an organizational arrangement in which 
knowledge and resources are pooled in order to realize outcomes. Although PPPs 
have become common practice in spatial planning and development, there is a 
continuous search for their ideal organizational form and management. This is fueled 
by the often poor performance in terms of e.g. time delays and budget overruns. 
Whilst comparative studies have been conducted into the outcomes of certain 
organizational forms and management strategies, fewer comparative studies evaluate 
their combined effects. The goal of this study is to explore what configurations of 
certain organizational forms and management may produce good outcomes. This is 
done by conducting a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of survey 
data of 50 managers involved in urban regeneration companies (URCs) in the 
Netherlands. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely known that spatial planning projects are haunted by a lingering history of 
poor performance in terms of, amongst other things, time delays and budget 
overruns. The seminal work by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) is illustrative in this respect. 
They conclude that private sector involvement may increase the performance of 
projects. This is also the central idea of public-private partnerships (PPPs); 
cooperation between public and private actors may result in added value (Ghobadian 
et al., 2004; Hodge et al., 2010; Osborne, 2000). 
 
1.1. Urban regeneration companies as PPPs 
 
One field in which PPPs are gaining ground is urban regeneration. The literature 
reports on a variety of urban regeneration partnerships (Geddes, 2008; Pierre, 1997). 
In various countries, new organizations are created where public and private actors 
are working together to stimulate, guide and implement processes of urban 
regeneration. These organizations are relatively independent, performing their 
activities at arm’s length from the political arena. Such companies are often referred 
to as urban regeneration companies (URCs) and they can be found in many countries 
like the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands. In the UK, URCs emerged after a 
report from the Urban Task Force (1999). This report stated that urban regeneration 
could be increased if arm’s length organizations, owned by local partnerships, were 
made responsible for delivering programs in terms of raising financial means, and for 
undertaking and overseeing direct development when deemed necessary. 
This idea of creating a form of PPP specifically aimed at solving problems in 
urban areas was also suggested in the Netherlands (VROM-Raad, 2002). The actors 
in the URC create and manage an intensified partnership in which they all share 
some of the risks involved in the endeavor. In the Netherlands, important partners 
include the local authority, housing associations and private parties such as 
developers and banks. Because no national guidelines exist, the Dutch landscape of 
URCs is characterized by a wide variety of organizational forms, ranging from tightly 
organized consortia to more loosely coupled organizations (Kort, 2011). However, in 
all forms the partners share control over the use of resources and the decisions that 
have to be made. 
 
1.2. Why partnerships would perform better 
 
There are different arguments why PPPs would produce better outcomes. The first 
argument concerns their organizational form and relates to the New Public 
Management (NPM) literature: because PPPs are positioned at arm’s length from the 
political decision-making arena and because they are organized as a distinct 
organizational identity, they are believed to be able to work more effectively and 
efficiently (Hodge and Greve, 2005; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). However, projects 
are planned and realized in networks of actors that are interconnected through 
resource dependencies, which are simultaneously fragmented in terms of e.g. goals, 
knowledge and resources (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; see Hodge et al., 2010). A 
public-private partnership is a specific organizational arrangement in which these 
public and private resources are pooled and managed to realize spatial projects. The 
second argument stems from the governance network literature and posits that 
network management is crucial to cope with the complexities and dynamics of 
networks surrounding PPPs and therefore a crucial factor for successful PPPs (cf. Van 
Gestel et al., 2012). 
Previous analyses looked at which explanation is the most plausible for 
producing good outcomes (Kort and Klijn, 2011; Steijn et al., 2011). In this study we 
aim to add to this literature by exploring what combinations of organizational forms 
and management result in good outcomes in PPPs. To this purpose, fuzzy set 
qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2008a) is used to answer the 
following research question: 
 
What combinations of organizational form and management strategies 
produce good outcomes in public-private partnerships in urban regeneration? 
 
This question is answered in several steps. The theoretical framework is 
presented in the next section. It discusses URCs as PPPs, and the importance of 
organizational characteristics and network management respectively. Section 3 
introduces the fsQCA methodology and its relevance for our research question, and it 
presents the operationalization, the survey data and the calibration of the data into 
fuzzy sets. The results of the fsQCA are presented in Section 4. Section 5 comprises 
the discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical framework: NPM and/or governance 
 
A PPP can be defined as a “co-operation between public and private actors with a 
durable character in which actors develop mutual products and/or services and in 
which risks, costs and benefits are shared” (Klijn and Teisman, 2003, page 137). It is 
assumed that a more intensive cooperation between public and private actors will add 
value by producing better and more efficient policy outcomes (Ghobadian et al., 
2004; Hodge and Greve, 2005; Savas, 2000). Private parties are involved earlier in 
the decision-making process and are said to contribute more intensively than is the 
case in more traditional client-supplier or principal-agent relationships. In the 
arguments about why PPPs would be effective, different arguments that come from 
different theoretical streams of literature can be recognized. On the one hand, 
emphasis is laid on the organizational form. In general, theoretical arguments in 
favor of the organizational features come from rational choice theory, principal-
agency theory and sometimes resource-dependency theories (Section 2.1). On the 
other hand, the importance of management is stressed. Arguments favoring 
management are rooted in network governance theory (Section 2.2). 
 
2.1. PPPs: theoretical arguments in favor of organizational form 
 
The arguments in favor of PPPs that emphasize the organizational form state that 
contracts and public-private separation will produce better and more efficient 
outcomes than when the service is provided by governments themselves (Hood and 
Jackson, 1991; Lane, 2000). Pollitt et al. (2004) indicate that the dominant 
inspiration for trends towards agencies and other arm’s length organizations comes 
from rational choice theories that stress the ability of these organizations to organize 
services or policies more efficiently. Since bureaucracies tend to maximize the 
number of staff and budgets, and because they are not under the pressure of market 
competition, they are less efficient than private organizations (Hood and Jackson, 
1991; Pollitt et al., 2004). Relatedly, contract theories (Deakin and Mitchie, 1997; 
Lane, 2000) and principal-agency theories specify the conditions under which 
agencies or other arm’s length bodies like PPPs perform well. There is a need to 
specify outcomes and monitor performance and behavior according to these theories 
(Hodge and Greve, 2005; Hood and Jackson, 1991; Hodge et al., 2010). 
Thus, this body of literature emphasizes efficiency and effectiveness, caused by 
increased competition, the need to perform according to clearly specified 
performance targets and the possibility of monitoring those targets (Verhoest et al., 
2004a). Of course, the question remains as to what type of organization is most 
suited to realize the benefits. In general, the argument is that these are tightly-
organized arrangements, which really are able to act on their own (i.e. at arm’s 
length) and thus need discretionary powers. Indeed, what is the use of a separate 
body that can organize its own delivery and performance if it does not has the 
possibility to act (see Hood and Jackson, 1991; Lane, 2000; Pollitt et al., 2004)? 
Theoretical arguments for a tight organizational structure between the partners 
stem from resource-dependency theories (Benson, 1982; Pfeffer, 1981) and neo-
institutional economics (Williamson, 1996). Resource-dependency theory suggests 
that the more interdependent partners are, the larger the need for organizing 
interactions (Donaldson, 1995; Mulford and Rogers, 1982). Indeed, partnerships are 
initiated because partners hope to harness each other’s resources. This, in turn, 
generates a stronger resource dependency. The same assumption can be found in 
neo-institutional theory. Partners invest in the relationship and incur specific 
transaction costs for this relationship which cannot be used for other relations 
(Williamson, 1996). Consequently, the level of dependency – and the possibilities 
that actors take advantage of that interdependency because the actor that made the 
investment cannot use that investment in another way – increases which in turn 
leads to a tight organizational structure in which partners try to minimize the ability 
of the other partner to walk away with a large share of the profits. 
To recapitulate, the literature expects PPPs and thus our URCs, to be efficient 
and effective since private involvement is organized in separate organizations at 
arm’s length that actually have the possibility and structure to act on their own (and 
thus have discretionary powers to act). 
 
2.1.1. Arm’s length, tightness and discretionary powers as organizational 
principles for URCs 
 
There are different conceptualizations of the notion of arm’s length. This 
contribution is inspired by Pollitt et al. (2004) who studied agencies in various 
countries. We emphatically say inspired since the positions of agencies they studied, 
being autonomized from their parent organizations (typically a ministry), are not 
quite the same as those of PPPs like URCs.1 In their research on agencies, Pollitt et al. 
(2004) distinguish between two dimensions of arm’s length: disaggregation and 
autonomization. Disaggregation can be defined as the degree of structural separation 
of an organization from its parent organization, i.e.: to what extent is the organization 
independent? It seems to relate to the ‘independence cluster of administrative DNA’ 
(Hood and Jackson, 1991). For this research, we focus on the relation between the 
URC and the city council plus elected officeholders. Since the arm’s length discussion 
in PPPs mainly focuses on these separations (Skelcher, 2005), we looked at the way 
in which political entities control the partnership. 
Disaggregation does not, however, imply that an organization is entirely free to 
make its own choices. Autonomization can be defined as the degree to which the 
organization has discretionary powers regarding inter alia the use of its financial 
resources, organizational structure, and project plans (cf. Verhoest et al., 2004b). 
Autonomization relates to the ‘decision-making cluster of administrative DNA’ (Hood 
and Jackson, 1991). For this study, we especially focus on the way the URC can make 
its own decisions independently from the various organizations that are its 
constituents. 
The tightness of the organization is a third feature. URC structures range widely 
from tightly organized consortia to more informal arrangements like project groups 
lacking judicial status. Discussions on the optimal organizational form abound in 
both PPP literature and government texts on PPPs (Klijn, 2010; NAO, 2001). 
However, these literatures lack agreement about which organizational form best suits 
PPPs. Whilst the PFI literature suggests that tight contracts binding public and 
private actors closely together are best, the literature that focuses on URCs suggests 
that tight partnerships established to operate at arm’s length are the superior form 
(VROM-Raad, 2002). Considering the above-discussed theoretical perspectives of 
resource-dependency and neo-institutional theory, it may be expected that more 
tightly organized partnerships generate better results (Benson, 1982; Negandhi, 
1975). In sum, the theoretical arguments suggest that PPPs will be more effective 
when [1] the level of disaggregation is larger (more at arm’s length), [2] they have 
more discretionary power, and [3] they are more tightly organized. 
 
                                                          
1 An agency has one parent organization; in a PPP all the partners are parents. 
2.2. PPPs: theoretical arguments in favor of management 
 
From a governance perspective, a PPP is a complex process involving public and 
private actors (who may have organized themselves in a separate organization), and a 
whole network of actors which have interests in the issues at hand. This is 
particularly true for spatial planning processes (Klijn et al., 2006). The governance 
literature stresses the importance of horizontal coordination between public and 
other actors, and the difficulty of reverting to top down steering (Pierre, 1997). Most 
of the literature stresses that active forms of network management are crucial to 
achieve outcomes (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Keast and Mandell, 2014; Mandell, 
2001). Network management is mostly defined as the deliberate attempts to facilitate 
and guide interactions between actors in the network (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). 
We conceptualize network management as a number of strategies to facilitate 
cooperation, explore (new) contents and arrange actors in the process (see Klijn et al., 
2010). Empirical evidence clearly indicates that network management is positively 
related to network performance (see e.g. Meier and O'Toole, 2007; Provan et al., 
2009; Klijn et al., 2010; Verweij et al., 2013). It is aimed at inter alia promoting 
public-private cooperation, the generation of new innovative solutions by pooling 
knowledge, and reducing veto powers and obstruction (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; 
Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; McGuire and Agranoff, 2011; Sørenson and Torfing, 
2007).  
This perspective has also permeated the PPP literature. For instance, it is 
assumed that public-private co-production results in intensified information 
exchanges and pooling of knowledge, and by doing so generates more innovative and 
higher quality products and policy outputs for complex societal problems (e.g. 
Edelenbos and Teisman, 2008). But it is also assumed that PPP projects take place in 
a larger network of actors who are affected by the PPP project and try to influence it 
(Steijn et al., 2011; Hodge et al., 2010). Although the governance literature does 
acknowledge the importance of organizational structure and form (Mandell, 2001), it 
tends to stress institutional and especially managerial characteristics for being 
decisive to achieving good outcomes. Such efforts are coined network management 
(Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Gage and Mandell, 1990; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; 
Meier and O'Toole, 2007). 
In sum, the governance literature stresses that it are network management 
strategies that actually make the difference and are responsible for achieving good 
results in PPPs.  
 
2.3. Beyond the dichotomy 
 
Considering the various arguments as to what produces good outcomes in PPPs, 
different groups of arguments originating from different theoretical perspectives can 
be identified. These could be captured in a dichotomous question (cf. Kort and Klijn, 
2011; Steijn et al., 2011). What is the key to successful PPPs: the form and monitoring 
of the partnerships (the assumption implicit in NPM types of arguments) or network 
management activities aimed at closer cooperation?  
Such a dichotomy can be analytically valuable. However, successful PPPs may 
not be due to either form or management strategies. Instead, they could very well 
combine to produce good outcomes. In the next section we introduce fsQCA – a 
relatively new approach to researching the planning, management and governance of 
spatial (PPP) projects (cf. Verweij et al., 2013; Verweij and Gerrits, 2015; Verweij, 
2015) – to explore how. Thus, in this article we want to explore the assumption that it 
are combinations that really generate good outcomes in PPP projects. 
 
3. Methodological framework  
 
In Section 3.1 we briefly explain the main features of fsQCA. In Section 3.2 we present 
the operationalization and survey data. Section 3.3 concerns the calibration into fuzzy 
set data. 
 
3.1. Fuzzy set QCA 
 
Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) can be used for analyzing 
combinations of conditions (i.e. configurations) in a systematized manner (Ragin, 
2008a). Moreover, fsQCA can be usefully applied to an intermediate number of cases, 
e.g. between 10 and 100 (Rihoux et al., 2009). 
In fsQCA, conditions (including the outcome) are perceived as sets, and cases 
can have degrees of membership in a set anywhere between 0 and 1. Conditions are 
not to be confused with variables. Whereas variables are “adversaries in the struggle 
to explain variation in dependent variables (…) [conditions are] potential 
collaborators in the production of outcomes” (Ragin, 2008a, page 113-114). Causality 
in fsQCA is expressed in terms of necessity and sufficiency. Basically, a condition is 
necessary if an outcome cannot be produced without it. A condition is sufficient if its 
presence always produces the outcome (but the outcome may also occur without the 
condition). These conditions can combine in various ways. Thus, causality in fsQCA is 
configurational (combinations of conditions produce the outcome), equifinal 
(different combinations may produce the outcome) and multifinal (a condition can 
play a different role in different configurations) (Grofman and Schneider, 2009). 
Four basic elements of conducting fsQCA are data tables, truth tables, solution 
formulas and parameters of fit (Grofman and Schneider, 2009). The data table (or 
raw data matrix) should be published along with the analysis (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2010) and is, hence, included as Appendix C. Each row presents a case 
(here: the scores of an individual manager of an URC on an item) and the columns 
present the different conditions including the outcome. The truth table is the key tool 
for the analysis. It lists all the logically possible configurations and sorts the cases 
accordingly (Ragin, 2008a). The table consists of 2k logically possible configurations, 
where k represents the number of conditions that is included in the analysis. Each of 
the combinations is assessed as to whether it is sufficient for the outcome to occur or 
not.2 Using fs/QCA software (Ragin and Davey, 2009), those configurations that are 
                                                          
2 Truth tables are used to analyze sufficiency. Necessity requires a separate analysis.  
identified as being sufficient are subsequently minimized using Boolean algebra 
resulting in different solution formulas (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 2012).3 
These analytical results are subsequently assessed for their fit with the underlying 
data using two measures: consistency and thereafter coverage (Ragin, 2008a; 
Schneider and Wagemann, 2010; 2012). The degree to which the empirical evidence 
supports the necessity and/or sufficiency of set-theoretic relations found through the 
analysis is expressed in terms of consistency. The way in which cases are distributed 
over these configurations is expressed in terms of coverage (Rihoux and Ragin, 
2009). 
 
3.2. Operationalization and survey data 
 
The internet survey was held between November 2006 and January 2007. The 
respondents were managers involved in Dutch urban regeneration partnerships 
present at that time. An extensive search was conducted to acquire a representative 
list of managers involved in Dutch URCs. Once the list was constructed, projects not 
aimed at physical regeneration were excluded. The remaining projects were all clearly 
aimed at urban regeneration, showed observable signs of public-private cooperation, 
and had organizational arrangements in place to guide the public-private 
interactions. The projects included physical restructuration, and sometimes 
additionally various socioeconomic interventions (see Kort, 2011, page 77-80). Of the 
210 individuals approached, 68 responded positively (approximately one third). Each 
respondent is a case in the analysis. Because 18 respondents failed to fully complete 
the survey, 50 cases are included in the present analysis. 
Organizational form comprises three conditions: functioning at arm’s length, 
discretionary powers and tightness, comprising respectively 8, 7 and 9 items. The 
fourth condition, management, consists of 16 items.4 The outcome condition 
comprises 6 items. The operationalization of the conditions is depicted in Appendices 
A and B. A five-point Likert scale (1 to 5) was used for all items. Appendix C provides 
the raw survey data. It shows the sum of the item scores (Sraw) for each condition per 
respondent. 
 
3.3. Calibration from variable scores to fuzzy sets 
 
Ragin (2008a, 2009) explains that interval and ratio scales need to be calibrated, 
using substantive and theoretical knowledge, to be able to determine the membership 
degrees of cases in a set. In this article, we use a continuous fuzzy set scale (Ragin, 
2009) since this transforms the survey data as little as possible. The three qualitative 
anchor points are full membership (1.000), full non-membership (0.000) and 
maximum ambiguity or crossover point (0.500). Determining the crossover point 
                                                          
3 There are three kinds of solution formulas: complex, intermediate and parsimonious.  
4 Since we are interested in the relation between the application of management strategies and 
outcomes we proceed with an aggregate management condition (cf. Kort and Klijn, 2011) consisting of 
four dimensions – arranging, exploring content, connecting/coordinating and committing – with 
four items each. 
(Scross) requires some extra explanation. A previous analysis with earlier survey data, 
using the same items, has shown that managers tend to valuate outcomes (OC) 
slightly higher than non-managers (Klijn et al., 2010). As shown in Table 1, we thus 
used the crossover point of 24 for the outcomes instead of middle (which is 18).5 This 
corresponds with an average score of 4 on the five-point Likert scale instead of the 
middle score 3 on each of the items. We think this is a logical choice since this is the 
score where a respondent really indicates that the outcome is positive while the 
middle score 3 does not. For the organizational conditions (F1-3) we set the crossover 
points at the score which lies in the middle.6  
For the condition management (M) a more complex calibration was performed. 
We stayed with the original approach used in previous analyses as this proved the 
most viable one (Kort, 2o11). Respondent scores of 1-3 and 4-5 on the Likert scale 
were transformed into a 0 and 1 respectively. This means that we only coded a certain 
managerial strategy (that is one of the 16 items) as ‘present’ when the respondent 
chooses for the score 4 or higher. Since this is actually the first positive score (3 is a 
neutral score or ‘maximum ambiguity’ in terms of QCA), this is a logical choice which 
also takes into account possible bias of the managers that may tend to overstate their 
managerial activities.7 The logically possible minimum total item score (Smin) for a 
respondent for M is thus 0 and the logically possible maximum score (Smax) is 16. The 
crossover point lies in the middle at 8.8 Table 1 summarizes our choices.  
                                                          
5 A crossover point of 24 would result in all cases with a score of 24 being excluded from the analysis 
since fsQCA cannot deal with so-called ‘maximum ambiguity’ in minimization procedures. Since a 
score of 24 is considered to present inclusion in the set OC, the crossover point is actually set at 23.9. 
6 Crossover points of 24, 21 and 27 respectively would result in all cases with these scores on the 
respective conditions being excluded from the analysis as fsQCA cannot deal with so-called ‘maximum 
ambiguity’ in minimization procedures. Since scores of 24, 21 and 27 respectively are considered to 
present exclusion in the sets F1, F2 and F3, the crossover points are actually set at 24.1, 21.1 and 27.1. 
7 This bias seems to be present when we looked at the summed item scores because a crossover point 
in the middle (which is 48) results in 3 cases under and 47 cases over the crossover point. 
8 As the lower range (0-7) is empirically smaller (scores of 0 and 1 are not present) than the upper 
range (9-16) (only a score of 16 is not present), the crossover point was set at 8.1, since fsQCA cannot 
deal with so-called ‘maximum ambiguity’ in minimization procedures. 
Table 1: calibration rules for transforming raw data into continuous fuzzy sets 
Condition Number 
of items 
Minimum score 
(Smin) = full non 
membership 
(0.000) 
Maximum score 
(Smax) = full 
membership 
(1.000) 
Crossover 
point (Scross) 
(0.500) 
Organization (F)     
Arm’s length (F1) 8 8 40 24.1 
Discretionary 
 powers (F2) 
7 7 35 21.1 
Tightness (F3) 9 9 45 27.1 
     
Management total (M) 16 0 16 8.1 
     
Outcomes (OC) 6 6 30 23.9 
     
 
Based on qualitative anchor points as defined in Table 1 (Smin, Smax and Scross), 
the raw data (Sraw) as provided in Appendix C are transformed to the fuzzy set scores 
(Sfuzz) of Appendix D. The calibration formula is provided in a footnote.9 
 
4. Results of fuzzy set analysis 
 
In this paragraph the results of the analysis of the fuzzy set data matrix (Appendix D) 
are presented. First, a distinction is made between cases which have an OC above the 
cross-over point and those that have an OC below the Scross. This is done in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: OC per case 
OC # cases Cases 
0 22 R1, R3, R6, R9, R10, R13, R14, R16, R18, R21, R23, R26, R31, R34, R35, R36, R37, R38, 
R42, R44, R49, R50 
1 28 R2, R4, R5, R7, R8, R11, R12, R15, R17, R19, R20, R22, R24, R25, R27, R28, R29, R30, 
R32, R33, R39, R40, R41, R43, R45 R46, R47, R48 
 
The next step is to construct the truth table, which is shown as Table 3. The first 
four columns represent the logically possible configurations present in the data. The 
13 rows show that not all of the 16 (24=16) logically possible configurations are 
actually present. The sixth and seventh columns display the cases related to these 
configurations.
                                                          
9 The Sraw width associated with ‘one unit’ of Sfuzz differs above and below the Scross since the Scross is not 
necessarily associated with the median of the raw data scores for a condition. Therefore, two separate 
formulas were developed. If Sraw < Scross, then Sfuzz = (Sraw – Smin) x [0.5/(Scross – Smin)]. If Sraw > Scross, 
then Sfuzz = 0.5 + {(Sraw – Scross) x [0.5/(Smax – Scross)]}. 
Table 3: truth table10 
F1 F2 F3 M Number 
of cases 
Sufficient 
for Oc 
Cases  Raw 
consistency 
PRI 
consistency 
Product ▼ 
1 0 1 1 2 1 R39, R45 0.996575 0.904002 0.900906 
0 1 1 1 8 1 R13, R17, R18, R20, R23, R29, R37, R43 0.983398 0.858956 0.844696 
0 1 0 0 1 1 R38 0.995010 0.839077 0.834890 
1 1 0 1 3 1 R22, R30, R35 0.989427 0.825505 0.816776 
1 1 1 1 15 0 R4, R5, R8, R11, R14, R16, R19, R25, R27, 
R32, R36, R40, R46, R47, R48 
0.933111 0.669940 0.625129 
1 1 1 0 7 0 R10, R12, R15, R24, R28, R41, R44 0.958134 0.632165 0.605699 
0 1 1 0 1 0 R6 0.979318 0.616644 0.603890 
1 1 0 0 2 0 R1, R31 0.979089 0.547620 0.536169 
1 0 0 0 2 0 R7, R50 0.987747 0.427998 0.422754 
0 0 0 0 1 0 R3 0.988151 0.380530 0.376021 
1 0 1 0 2 0 R34, R42 0.974517 0.373830 0.364303 
0 0 1 0 4 0 R9, R21, R26, R33 0.981108 0.316800 0.310815 
1 0 0 1 2 0 R2, R49 0.978317 0.297588 0.291136 
 
                                                          
10 Raw consistency expresses the consistency of a single truth table row. However, in fsQCA a condition can be both a subset of the outcome (OC) and its negation 
(~OC) (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Without going into the technical details, this can result in high raw consistency scores as we can see in Table 2. PRI 
consistency stands for Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency. This expresses how much it helps to know that a given condition is a subset of the outcome. If 
PRI yields a low score, then the consistency score for both OC and its negation (~OC) are very close to each other. The PRI can be multiplied with the raw 
consistency score which yield the PRODUCT score. Basically, a low PRODUCT score means that a condition is not sufficient for the outcome (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). 
The truth table was analyzed with the fuzzy set truth table algorithm.11 First we 
have to decide which configurations to include in the analysis of sufficiency. Two 
generally accepted rules are used: consistency and frequency (Ragin, 2008a; 2008b; 
Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Having examined the PRODUCT scores in Table 3, 
we decided to set the consistency cutoff point at 0.816776 since this indicates a clear 
gap (cf. Vis, 2009). This score is considered as acceptable in the literature (Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012). As a result, configurations that do not meet this value (or that 
have a fuzzy outcome value lower than 0.50000) are indicated with a ‘0’ in the 
‘sufficient for OC’ column (Table 3) and are excluded from the minimization 
procedure. The first four configurations meet the consistency criterion and are 
assigned a ‘1’ in that column. Ragin (2008a, 2008b) explains that when the number 
of cases is relatively small a frequency threshold of about 1 or 2 should be used. Since 
we have an intermediate number of cases (50) we have set the threshold at 2. This 
means that this leaves us with three configurations for the analysis (the first, second 
and fourth row of Table 3). The results of the analysis are depicted in Table 4. Note 
that although scores are presented as zeroes and ones in the truth table, the 
underlying data used in the analysis are the original fuzzy scores (see Appendix D). 
Since our research question aims at identifying combinations of organizational form 
and management towards good outcomes, we have only considered the complex 
solution in our analysis which means that no simplifying assumptions were made. 
 
Table 4: complex solution for OC 
 Path 1 Path 2 Path 3 
 F1*F2*~F3*M F1*~F2*F3*M ~F1*F2*F3*M 
Raw coverage 0.455 0.522 0.640 
Unique coverage 0.027 0.057 0.156 
Consistency 0.989 0.997 0.983 
    
Solution coverage 0.735 
Solution consistency 0.977 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
 
In this article we set out to explore which organizational characteristics and 
management conditions combine to produce good outcomes in PPPs. Moreover, the 
aim was to refine earlier regression analyses performed on the same data, which 
found that managerial strategies are highly relevant for producing good outcomes 
while organizational characteristics are not (Kort and Klijn, 2011). Before interpreting 
the results and drawing conclusions, we first reflect on the method and the 
limitations of the study. 
 
                                                          
11 A preceding analysis for necessary conditions revealed that there are no necessary conditions. Given 
the raw consistency scores, we took a conservative approach. For OC the necessity test revealed: F1 
(con. 0.903, cov. 0.840); F2 (con. 0.918, cov. 0.781); F3 (con. 0.948, cov. 0.754); M (con. 0.887, cov. 
0.815). 
5.1. Reflection on the method and analysis 
 
Considering respondents as cases in fsQCA implies that we take single observations 
as reliable measures of some reality (e.g. the PPP in which a respondent is involved). 
As a result, small ‘measurement errors’ such as respondent biases may have an 
impact in minimalizing the causal statements presented in a truth table, especially 
when many cases are on (or just over) the crossover point (which expresses 
maximum ambiguity). Note, however, that although this may significantly change the 
picture provided by the first row in Table 4 (i.e. the paths), the ‘parameters of fit’ 
scores are more robust because a configuration can be interpreted as “sufficient if, 
across all cases, set membership in it is smaller than or equal to each case’s 
membership in the outcome” (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, page 333, italics 
added). This means that consistency scores for paths are based upon all cases present 
in the truth table. 
As stressed by many authors (e.g. Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Rihoux, 2003; 
Ragin, 1987; 2000; 2008a; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012), QCA is first and 
foremost a research approach that facilitates dialogue between ideas and evidence. 
Using survey data makes this harder (cf. Cooper and Glaesser, 2012). This is reflected 
in the rather mechanical calibration process in this article. First, it is difficult to 
include additional information (e.g. interviews and observations) to assess 
membership scores of respondents as cases in sets, which may provide a solid basis 
for scoring cases. Second, it is difficult to engage with individuals (Rihoux et al., 
2009) and reach the desired level of intimacy with each case. Third, strategies to 
encounter contradictory rows and limited diversity – such as adding/dropping cases, 
recalibrating conditions, and adding/dropping conditions – in the process of 
calibrating survey data into fuzzy scores are more difficult to use.  
These limitations are reflected in the results of the analysis. As can be seen from 
Tables 3 and 4, the three paths resulting from the analysis are actually no 
minimizations at all, i.e. they are equal to the three configurations in Table 3 with a 
positive score on the outcome (and with more than one case). Nothing is gained with 
the truth table minimization. Given the nature of the data, however, we opted for a 
conservative approach and did not work with counterfactual analyses which would 
produce more parsimonious results. Despite this limitation, the results are valid 
sufficient configurations nevertheless, indicated by the high consistency and 
PRODUCT scores. 
Notwithstanding the important issues mentioned above, it is understood that 
survey data may be used to perform fsQCA (e.g. Cooper and Glaesser, 2012; cf. 
Schneider and Wagemann, 2010), and we further explored this option in the present 
article. For our research, fsQCA helped us to refine the research findings in 
identifying multiple combinations of conditions that are sufficient for producing good 
outcomes. However, researchers have to be aware of and transparent about these 
methodological issues, as we did above. Cooper and Glaesser (2012) and Schneider 
and Wagemann (2010) suggest that the impossibility of in-depth case knowledge in 
our analysis may be somewhat supplemented with interpretation of the patterns 
based on theory. Hence, we connected the findings to earlier research and theoretical 
discussions on PPP, which are inter alia supported by insights from previous in-depth 
case study research (cf. Kort, 2011). Although this does not solve the limitations as 
mentioned above, it may relieve them somewhat. 
 
5.2. Conclusions 
 
The analysis identified three combinations of organizational form and management 
that can be said to produce good outcomes in PPPs in urban regeneration projects. 
The first path states that organizations at arm’s length, with more discretionary 
powers, that are loosely tight, and that employ many network management strategies 
produce good outcomes in PPPs. The second path states that organizations at arm’s 
length, with few discretionary powers, that are tightly organized, and that employ 
many network management strategies produce good outcomes in PPPs. The third 
path states that organizations not at arm’s length, with more discretionary powers, 
that are tightly organized, and that employ many network management strategies 
produce good outcomes in PPPs. What these results reveal, first, is that the 
employment of network management strategies matters to produce good outcomes in 
PPPs (cf. Kort and Klijn, 2011). Second, the analysis shows that organizational form 
matters as well, since no path is without any F conditions (cf. Kort and Klijn, 2011). 
However, not all organizational conditions are required at the same time to achieve 
good outcomes. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the fsQCA is that combinations of 
conditions matter. Producing good outcomes in public-private partnerships is, 
according to experts (i.e. our survey respondents) in the field of urban regeneration, 
not a matter of ‘either/or’, but a matter of ‘and/and’: correctly combining 
organizational form and network management strategies is what tips the balance. The 
results of the analysis presented in this contribution thus indeed provided a 
refinement. 
Based on the results, it can be concluded that all three organizational conditions 
do contribute to good outcomes. In that sense, the fsQCA shows something extra 
compared to the earlier research, where the contribution of organizational conditions 
was not significant (Kort and Klijn, 2011). This may not be surprising though, since 
the research approaches are designed to address different questions (Grofman and 
Schneider 2009; Vis 2012). However, the results indicate that fsQCA and regression 
analysis can be complementary (and not contradictory): in both approaches network 
management is centrally important. And when correctly combined with 
organizational strategies, its value may be even higher for achieving good outcomes in 
PPPs. Put differently, installing the correct organizational features is important, but 
this cannot be relied upon without active network management. 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A: operationalization of organizational form (adapted from Kort and Klijn, 2011) 
Items Arm’s length (F1) Discretionary powers (F2) Tightness (F3) 
  To what extent does the joint 
organization have the power to 
make decisions on its own about: 
To what degree the following activities are 
undertaken or performed together in the 
URC: 
1 A clear framework was set by the city 
council that determined the ranges of 
freedom for the URC. 
Doing research (e.g. financial 
feasibility studies). 
The sharing of knowledge between 
cooperating actors. 
2 Control over the project by the city 
council was tight. 
The definition of the physical 
program. 
The sharing of costs for research or an 
architect. 
3 The city council wants to be informed 
frequently on the progress of the project. 
The definition of the social 
and/or economic program.  
The sharing of investments (e.g. buying land 
and properties). 
4 The city council wants to be informed 
only when the project steps outside the 
defined framework. 
The acquisition of land and 
property. 
The sharing of financial risks. 
5 A clear framework was set up by the city 
directorate that determined range of 
freedom for the URC. 
Interaction with and organizing 
input of stakeholders. 
The cooperation in formulating visions and 
plans. 
6 Control over the project by the city 
directorate was tight. 
The closing of contracts with 
(private) parties for realization. 
The cooperation in doing research. 
7 The city directorate wants to be informed 
frequently on the progress of the project. 
The realization of the project. Joint selection of parties for the realization 
phase. 
8 The city directorate wants to be informed 
only when the project steps outside the 
defined framework. 
 The cooperation in governmental 
consultations. 
9   The cooperation in stakeholder consultations. 
Appendix B: operationalization of management and content (adapted from Kort and Klijn, 2011) 
Arranging (M1) The relevant public parties are involved through organized forms of consultation. 
The relevant private parties are involved through organized forms of consultation. 
The relevant social parties are involved through organized forms of consultation. 
In the different phases of the project, connections with new parties are sought. 
Exploring content (M2) The decision-making process is enriched by the involvement of different opinions. 
In this project, sufficient attention is paid to the mutual exchange of information.  
In the information gathering process, the development and determination of mutual standing points 
are emphasized. 
The project emphasizes the (external) generation of new ideas and innovative solutions. 
Connecting/coordinating (M3) Sufficient attention is paid to communication between the various parties involved in the project. 
In this project, emphasis is placed on making choices together so that the direction of the project is 
recognized by the parties involved. 
In this project, sufficient attention is paid to the basis and development of actor and personal 
relationships. 
In times of conflict during the project, emphasis is placed on bringing together conflicting interests.  
Committing (M4) Parties are bound to each other by making arrangements and keeping each other to those 
arrangements. 
Parties must sometimes incur losses because of their commitment to the project. 
Agreements are flexible in order to be able to deviate if required. 
Exit strategies are available if required to protect the interests of actors. 
Content (OC) The proposals are innovative. 
My organization had enough input in the proposals. 
Spatial functions are related in the right way. 
The proposals really tackle the problems in the area. 
The proposals are realistic and financially feasible. 
The proposals are future proof and sustainable. 
Appendix C: raw data matrix 
Respondent 
(Ri) 
Organizational form (F)   
Arm’s 
length 
(F1) 
Discretionary 
powers (F2) 
Tightness 
(F3) 
Total 
management 
(M) 
Content 
(OC) 
1 29 23 20 8 22 
2 25 11 24 11 24 
3 20 15 20 8 23 
4 33 34 40 15 27 
5 34 27 38 10 28 
6 23 31 40 5 20 
7 26 18 24 8 24 
8 26 34 43 11 26 
9 24 21 32 5 21 
10 26 27 30 6 20 
11 29 25 35 12 24 
12 25 32 37 7 24 
13 24 28 37 9 23 
14 30 28 36 12 22 
15 29 29 43 6 26 
16 26 28 36 11 21 
17 22 22 34 11 24 
18 24 28 36 12 23 
19 27 28 44 13 24 
20 18 35 42 15 30 
21 16 15 30 7 23 
22 25 26 27 13 25 
23 18 24 29 11 23 
24 31 31 41 5 24 
25 27 25 43 10 24 
26 21 21 28 7 23 
27 31 25 29 10 24 
28 30 27 42 8 25 
29 24 32 34 11 28 
30 37 31 26 12 26 
31 29 26 23 4 23 
32 29 28 37 12 24 
33 20 16 28 3 24 
34 28 12 32 5 22 
35 32 24 25 11 23 
36 27 28 36 10 21 
37 20 23 30 9 22 
38 24 23 22 5 23 
39 28 18 28 13 24 
40 30 34 42 12 24 
41 27 28 45 8 27 
42 25 20 29 2 22 
43 21 24 35 13 26 
44 31 31 44 6 23 
45 32 20 36 12 24 
46 30 23 36 15 24 
47 30 24 36 10 24 
48 30 22 34 11 27 
49 26 19 25 11 22 
50 25 10 21 8 19 
 
Appendix D: fuzzy set data matrix 
Respondent 
(Ri) 
Organizational form (F)   
Arm’s 
length 
(F1) 
Discretionary 
powers (F2) 
Tightness 
(F3) 
Total 
management 
(M) 
Content 
(OC) 
1 0,654 0,568 0,304 0,494 0,447 
2 0,528 0,142 0,414 0,684 0,508 
3 0,373 0,284 0,304 0,494 0,475 
4 0,780 0,964 0,860 0,937 0,754 
5 0,811 0,712 0,804 0,620 0,836 
6 0,466 0,856 0,860 0,309 0,391 
7 0,560 0,390 0,414 0,494 0,508 
8 0,560 0,964 0,944 0,684 0,672 
9 0,497 0,496 0,637 0,309 0,419 
10 0,560 0,712 0,581 0,370 0,391 
11 0,654 0,640 0,721 0,747 0,508 
12 0,528 0,892 0,777 0,432 0,508 
13 0,497 0,748 0,777 0,557 0,475 
14 0,686 0,748 0,749 0,747 0,447 
15 0,654 0,784 0,944 0,370 0,672 
16 0,560 0,748 0,749 0,684 0,419 
17 0,435 0,532 0,693 0,684 0,508 
18 0,497 0,748 0,749 0,747 0,475 
19 0,591 0,748 0,972 0,810 0,508 
20 0,311 1,000 0,916 0,937 1,000 
21 0,248 0,284 0,581 0,432 0,475 
22 0,528 0,676 0,497 0,810 0,590 
23 0,311 0,604 0,553 0,684 0,475 
24 0,717 0,856 0,888 0,309 0,508 
25 0,591 0,640 0,944 0,620 0,508 
26 0,404 0,496 0,525 0,432 0,475 
27 0,717 0,640 0,553 0,620 0,508 
28 0,686 0,712 0,916 0,494 0,590 
29 0,497 0,892 0,693 0,684 0,836 
30 0,906 0,856 0,470 0,747 0,672 
31 0,654 0,676 0,387 0,247 0,475 
32 0,654 0,748 0,777 0,747 0,508 
33 0,373 0,319 0,525 0,185 0,508 
34 0,623 0,177 0,637 0,309 0,447 
35 0,748 0,604 0,442 0,684 0,475 
36 0,591 0,748 0,749 0,620 0,419 
37 0,373 0,568 0,581 0,557 0,447 
38 0,497 0,568 0,359 0,309 0,475 
39 0,623 0,390 0,525 0,810 0,508 
40 0,686 0,964 0,916 0,747 0,508 
41 0,591 0,748 1,000 0,494 0,754 
42 0,528 0,461 0,553 0,123 0,447 
43 0,404 0,604 0,721 0,810 0,672 
44 0,717 0,856 0,972 0,370 0,475 
45 0,748 0,461 0,749 0,747 0,508 
46 0,686 0,568 0,749 0,937 0,508 
47 0,686 0,604 0,749 0,620 0,508 
48 0,686 0,532 0,693 0,684 0,754 
49 0,560 0,426 0,442 0,684 0,447 
50 0,528 0,106 0,331 0,494 0,363 
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